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Emerging anti-pluralism in new democracies – the case of Hungary 
 
After more than two decades of democracy since the system change in 
1989-1990, and seven years of membership in the European Union since 2004, 
in some countries of the ECE region a new populism is on the rise, which 
questions the achieved consolidation of pluralist democracy. Although right 
wing populism is on the rise even in some Western European countries, in the 
new democracies it involves more risk for democracy and is probably 
motivated by general disappointment in the fruits of system change, 
deteriorated by hardships of economic crisis. We could discern signs of 
populist politics earlier, but now it is at least in one case, Hungary, not only 
subject to severe criticism by political journalists and commentators, who 
complain about Hungarian government policies restricting democratic rights, 
but we can see also publicly announced concerns of officials of the EU 
commissioners, EP representatives and officials of other international 
organizations. An open debate about Hungarian media law and constitutional 
changes got on the agenda of the European Parliament, and in some basic 
policy issues a procedure against violation of EU norms is underway on 
European Commission level, not to speak about investigations initiated by the 
European Council and the Venice Commission for Democracy by Law. From 
the US foreign office even a diplomatic demarche has been handed over to the 
Hungarian government in the autumn of 2011, which expressed concerns over 
violating the principle of checks and balances, curbing the autonomy of 
controlling institutions and the new media act restricting freedom of press. 
Such gestures are rather unusual among friendly powers belonging to the same 
alliance.  
The Hungarian government lead by Viktor Orbán refuses the criticism 
and denies the necessity of such procedures. It claims the sovereign rights of a 
nation state to change its constitution and remodel the whole political system 
according to its concept on national causes, referring to its great electoral 
victory in the 2010 parliamentary elections, when the Hungarian Civil Union 
gained 53 per cent of the votes. Due to the disproportional electoral system 
and mandate distribution it acquired a decisive two-third majority in the 
parliament. The party leader called this a “revolution in the (electoral) booths”, 
and interpreted it as a general authorization by the people to change the whole 
political system. He asserted that the political system negotiated during the 
system change was ill-conceived and has run down, and must be replaced by a 
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new “system of national co-operation”, a notion that has undeniable 
authoritarian overtones.  
 That the several waves of democratization may suffer setbacks was 
stated already in Huntington’s original concept on waves of democratization as 
a historical fact. (Huntington, 1993.), a possibility reflected also critically by 
Wolfgang Merkel (Merkel, 2010.) My paper deals with the question, how 
serious such concerns are in regard of democratic consolidation of the new 
ECE-member-states of EU, and what reasons might stand behind such an 
“authoritarian slide” in Hungary. 
 
Pluralist Democracy Wanted  
 
Before the system change pluralism was with few exceptions (notably in 
Poland, see writings of Stanislaw Ehrlich (Pluralism and Marxism, in: Ehrlich 
– Wootton, 1980, p. 34-46), and in Hungary some publications on pluralism 
since the beginning of the 80’s (Bayer-Hardy, 1985.), strongly refused and 
condemned by the official monistic Marxist-Leninist ideology as a bourgeois 
political concept which veiled the class-character of capitalist society and 
served to obscure the class-rule of the capitalists. The democratic effects, the 
positive sides of pluralism which (even under capitalism) allowed for the non-
propertied classes the right to self-defense, and vindicated rights and defended 
interests for groups of people against an overwhelming state power, were 
thoroughly dismissed (as such powers had to be feared also in the own statist-
corporative system). The monolithic structure of power under state-socialism, 
with the organizational monopoly of the state-party was regarded by the rulers 
as the only guarantee of maintaining public ownership of the means of 
production and a centrally administered socialist order. The dominant role of 
the state-party was secured even in countries where the remnants of the earlier 
party system survived in the form of so called block-parties (as in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and GDR, which could later on serve as a ground for 
revitalizing party pluralism during and after the changes). Anti-pluralism has 
been a basic tenet of the official ideology in the whole socialist camp, and its 
acceptance was a pre-requisite for entering public service or playing a public 
role in general. But it affected not only party politics but the whole civil society 
which became paralyzed in its self-organizational capacity, as only licensed 
interest organizations were allowed to function under the supervision of the 
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party-state power. Therefore the interpretation of the “soft revolutions” of 1989 
as a revolt of the civil society against the omnipotent state power, shared by 
many leftist activists and ideologues, was a small misunderstanding. This myth 
has been successfully refuted by Stephen Kotkin in his book on The Uncivil 
Society.. (Kotkin, 2010.) Civil society could gain broad ground only after the 
changes.  
It is generally acknowledged that one of the great achievements of the 
1989/90 „soft” revolutions in ECE has been the establishment of Western type 
pluralist democracies on the ruins of the imploded monolithic order of soviet 
type political systems. The speed of the political changes was astounding, 
especially in regard of the seemingly unmovable, stable authoritarian regimes 
that – despite small modifications – withstood decades. Within one year all the 
regimes in ECE collapsed in the vogue of the implosion and dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and its declared withdrawal from its position of a guardian (in 
critical term: imperial) power over the ECE region  a relation established 
originally after its victory over Nazi Germany and its war allies in 1945, 
sanctioned by Yalta Agreement and frozen by the cold war. (The Agreement of 
course did not foresee that the victor should impose upon the defeated 
countries its own political system by force.)  
The dissolution of this geopolitical deadlock was an epochal event of the 
late twentieth century which offered new perspectives for democratic political 
development in the region, not to speak about the new geopolitics of post-cold-
war world order. More and more countries joined the “third wave of 
democratization”, a major trend that began with the fall of authoritarian 
regimes in South America and South Europe a decade before.  
Poland has been the fore-runner in this development with its strong 
system-opposition of Solidarnosc, a movement which proved to be a major 
force in dissolving communist power. Its strength rooted in its massive social 
mobilization of working people, a fact that effectively questioned the self-
legitimating ideology of the regime as being a power in the interest of the 
workers.  Hungary with its liberal economic reforms and a modestly tolerant 
political climate followed this trend from the mid 1980s, after the regime 
proved ineffective in dealing with its protracted economic stagnation and high 
debt-crisis. Parties of opposition emerged here already before the system 
change, and the Central Committee of USAP, the ruling state party, had to 
officially acknowledge and declare the principle of political pluralism as early 
as 1988. Sooner or later as if through a domino effect all existing state-socialist 
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regimes with their monolithic, apparently solid power-structure fell apart in 
the whole region. From social movements new political parties emerged that 
questioned the power monopoly of the ruling state party, whatever its name 
was. With the exception of Romania, where a palace revolt disguised as a 
genuine revolution of the street and broadcasted in state television, had to 
topple the autocratic and paranoid regime of Ceausescu, in all countries a 
peacefully negotiated „constitutional engineering” followed, whereby Western 
models of pluralist democracy were copied, being colored by elements of local 
traditions. All over Central Europe liberal-democratic parliamentary systems 
had been established with separation of powers, including new constitutional 
courts, a broad multi-party system, well established three-partite organized 
interests, a liberated media landscape, with guaranteed political freedoms for 
expression and organization, and free elections. The founding elections in 
1990 legitimated the new order and later constitutional modifications (such as 
the local self-government act) have  completed it. The new system could be 
rightly called pluralist democracy. (Bozóki, 2003) The new governments could 
begin with the difficult work of abolishing the command economy and 
introducing institutions of a market economy, with all the conflicts this process 
involved. There existed, above all political differences of the major parties, a 
basic consensus in regard of the pluralistic parliamentary democracy based on 
the rule of law, the necessity of the economic reforms (including privatization), 
and the joining of the Euro-Atlantic institutions (NATO and the European 
Community/Union).  
I would like to stress that the reestablishment of democratic pluralism 
was greeted with great relief in the whole polity. The new freedoms were 
largely enjoyed by all democratic (and by the same token, of course, also by 
non-democratic) forces. After the regime changes, new parties and civil 
organizations blossomed and became part of everyday social life, even if many 
of them have been sooner or later occupied by the major parties which drew 
their elites foremost from the activists of civil societies and interest 
organizations. 
Despite the emerging of a broad civil society with its numerous 
organizations and large networks, anti-pluralist attitudes remained  strong in 
the political culture of the large population, having firm roots in the 
authoritarian past of the prewar period. The specters of the past haunted soon 
when the social conflicts accompanying the economic reforms emerged. 
Decades of communist power which suppressed rather than resolved old 
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historical cleavages did not help to overcome authoritarian attitudes of the 
past. While Robert A. Dahl’s statement that a pluralist self-organizing of 
society emerges everywhere as soon as the brakes on freedom fall apart (Dahl: 
Pluralism revisited, in Ehrlich – Wootton, 1980, p. 20.), proved to be fully right 
in the process of the system change, it turned out that engraved authoritarian 
habits could not easily disappear from one day to another. Especially when the 
rival political forces used different political traditions to fight with each other, 
the old cultural and ideological cleavage of populists versus urbanites, 
nationalists versus liberal Westerners, modernizers versus conservatives have 
soon emerged as a major division of political life. Such cleavages were not 
necessarily detrimental to pluralism, rather part of it. However, when it turned 
out that the system change could not fulfill the welfare expectations the 
population awaited from democracy, and instead, a new impoverishment set in 
for a large segment of population, criticism on “party quarrels” became soon 
loud in the public discourse. Instead of the fine pluralism and liberal tolerance 
of many interests, world views, life-styles and so on, they claimed that parties 
should rather unite in a big national consensus for resolving the basic 
economic problems and care for the needs of  ordinary people. Concerned 
groups turned against the new democratic parties.  In Hungary as early as 
1992 the Society of “People Living below the Existential Minimum” initiated a 
national referendum aimed at dissolving the first multi-party parliament. They 
managed to collect the necessary number of signatures, but the newly 
established Constitutional Court ruled out such an anti-parliamentary action 
by principle, even if the initiators called only for new elections and did not 
want a return to authoritarian rule.  
Nevertheless, party pluralism took hold, even if participation in party 
politics remained generally very low ever since. After two decades of political 
freedom politics is still regarded by many people as a dirty business in which 
they do not wish to be involved at all. In a European Social Survey comparative 
research report Hungary hold the last position among 22 countries in 2002, 
according to mean values for political participation. “The relative position of 
Hungary improved by 2009, but only because Turkey and Bulgaria also 
entered the survey. Only Portugal lagged behind Hungary out of the “older” 
member states.” (European Social Register, 2010, p. 138.) As has been said by 
surveying sociologists, we generally like democracy but do not use it. Trust in 
political institution (foremost in parties and in parliament is utmost low (2 
points from 10), lagging far behind in European comparison, but even trust in 
compatriots is not much better. Hungarian citizens are among the least 
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satisfied with their life. These foundlings are bad news for democratic 
consolidation in a changing society. 
 
A turn to anti-pluralism? 
 
Since the world financial crisis, the debt-ridden euro-zone and 
economic recession holds on, the demand for being protected by the state, 
instead of a not so well flourishing free market economy, became louder and 
more perceptible in the large population. This is the ground on which political 
populism and collectivist ideologies flourish and a new anti-pluralist trend 
comes strong on the political agenda. Such problems stood already earlier 
behind Meciarism in Slovakia, the populist government of the PIS with the 
Kaczinsky twins in Poland, even before the world financial crisis. In Hungary 
the populist turn came along when the government of the party-leader Viktor 
Orbán achieved a landslide victory in the 2010 parliamentary elections. He 
stands out for a strong state, and for the re-nationalization of certain branches 
of the service sector and industry. The government strives for recentralization 
of power, taking rights back from the municipal self-governments and tries to 
curb rights of his opponents. 
In my paper I would like to concentrate on the Hungarian experience I 
know best, all the more because it stands in the centre of international debates. 
The chances of democratic consolidation in the region under the strains of the 
present economic hardships became even more doubtfulwith the signs of a 
threatening backslide to authoritarianism. 
 
Democracy endangered or pluralism constrained?  
I do not want to engage in discussing to what extent democracy is 
endangered because this might misguide the whole debate. A clear-cut 
distinction between democracy and dictatorship is a difficult task anyway, as 
government systems are very complex and ever more relegated to multiple 
levels of governance. Such contrasting ideal-types seem anyway to lie on the 
two ends of a continuum. Also, there exist several types of democracies, 
institutionally better developed and less differentiated, stable and less stable 
ones, democracies of different quality due to duration and also depending on 
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the established political culture in each country. We should not forget the 
warning of Ralph Dahrendorf that a certain dose of populism is part of any 
democracy, and that political rivals often indict each other by this term 
(Dahrendorf, 2007). For my purpose I am therefore pleased with the 
minimalist definition of democracy used by Huntington, and concentrate 
rather on signs of a discernible anti-pluralist turn by the new political course of 
the Hungarian “system of national co-operation” conceived by Victor Orbán. 
This has been introduced since 2010, buttressed by hasty legislation, based on 
a new constitution (called “Basic Law”) with a clear ideological ground, and the 
creation of a lot of new institutions all labeled as “National”. 
Huntington justified his “minimalist” definition of democracy with the 
argument that moral and material criteria cannot provide consensus about the 
essence of democracy. His main criterion is that the electorate, through 
periodically held elections, can peacefully remove the government by 
exercising its democratic oversight: “Elections, open, free and fair, are the 
essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non… Governments produced 
by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, and 
incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These qualities 
may make such governments undesirable but they do not make them 
undemocratic. Democracy is one public virtue, not the only one, and the 
relation of democracy to other public virtues and vices can only be understood 
if democracy is clearly distinguished from other characteristics of political 
systems.” (Huntington, 1993, pp. 9-10.) I think this is a well formulated 
argument which is to be taken into consideration. 
In the same vein Adam Przeworski states in his work on the relation of 
democracy and economic development: “democracy for us is a regime in which 
those who govern are selected through contested elections. This definition has 
two parts: government” and “contestation”. “ (Przeworski, loc. 265.) It is worth 
mentioning that Robert A. Dahl introduced the term “polyarchy” exactly to 
avoid the strict classification into democracy and dictatorship; This notion 
stressed two basic elements of political order: public contestation and 
participation, and by crossing these two criteria he gained a comparative 
framework for more exact measuring and evaluation of changing political 
systems (Dahl, 1970, p. 9.). 
Therefore, despite the severe criticism on the curbing of democratic 
rights and freedoms (of which I find many arguments rightful) I resist the 
temptation to question the existence of democracy as a system of government 
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in Hungary, as long as it is possible to change the government in free and fair 
elections. I concentrate rather on the issue, how far pluralism is stifled by the 
present governing power through its new ideology and power politics, and how 
far the necessary freedoms for free and fair elections may have been impaired 
by the constitutional changes recently introduced in the country. 
 
The New Vision of a sovereign, unitary nation state 
  
Every real political turn begins with a new vision and related 
conceptions. The political philosophy of the new course has been mapped out 
in a famous speech of the charismatic party leader Viktor Orbán shortly before 
the 2010 election held internally in front of a friendly circle of intellectuals:  
“Until recently, Hungarian politics had been characterized by a dual 
field of force. In these days this duality of the system seems to cease, and a 
central political field of force is in the making…” And he follows: “There is a 
real chance that the next fifteen-twenty years has not to be determined by the 
dual field of force, accompanied by constant quarrels about values, generating 
devising, narrow and needless social consequences. Instead, a big governing 
party comes into being, a central political power field, which persist and will be 
able to restate the national cause – and all this not through continuous 
debates, but representing this through its own natural weight.” 
“Either we try to build up a system of government, which minimizes the 
chance to restore the dual field of force, being able to arrange the political 
issues, or we prepare for a counter-government, but then the dual field of force 
will be reestablished. It is my conviction that we should not pursue a counter-
governance, but that we should establish a government of the national 
cause(s).” (Orbán’s speech in Kötcse, 2009, taken from the homepage 
www.nagyitas.hu, quoted in my own translation.) 
This vision about a great unified national party which stays persistently 
in the centre of the political field unrivalled by any real alternative force has its 
historic predecessor in the Hungarian pre-war authoritarian system 
dominated by the “Unified Party”. Such a system was not really a pluralist 
party system, even if some other parties were tolerated, but could be defined 
rather as a “dominant” or a “hegemonic” party system (see M. Duverger, G. 
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Sartori), in which all other parties are doomed to secondary role due to a 
clientele-policy of the ruling elite in a basically segmented society.  
The cited text allows a more benign interpretation, too: that the 
exemplary source of this vision is to find rather in a modern Christian 
Democratic catch-all party like the German Union parties were under the long 
Adenauer period in Germany or later under Helmut Kohl (whom Orbán 
admired). The text allows such an interpretation when Orbán says: “my 
suggestion is that instead of the politics adjusted to constant struggle, we 
should choose politics adjusted to the continuous government; not perpetual 
fighting of the opponents should determine our way of thinking but rather the 
convincing representation of certain national causes. Naturally there will be 
competition and at the end the voters will decide. The question is what kind of 
alternative we can provide.” (Italics mine.) 
This text would support the democratic reading of the pronouncement. 
The critical test of this statement stands still out as the next election is coming 
only in 2014. The question is, what happens in the meantime, whether the 
possibility to form competing alternatives provided for the constituency to 
choose from will be maintained or restricted by various legal and political 
changes? A recent announcement of the prime minister according to which 
“you should look at my deeds, not my words”1, entitles us to judge on ground of 
political and institutional changes that had been introduced by the new 
government since its inauguration. Whether these support the more equitable 
interpretation of his great vision or just the opposite, proving the more critical 
interpretation, can be decided on ground of the policies pursued since getting 
to power. The evolving shape of the new “system of national co-operation” 
might leave some doubts for a favorable reading.  
First, Orbán’s national sentiment seems to go well beyond being an 
ardent patriot; he uses nationalism as a means of “identity politics” 
characteristic generally of populism. This serves to unite his own political 
camp of followers (not to speak of the common ground with the radical right in 
this respect), by constant confrontation with opposing political forces that are 
often branded as un-national, alien-hearted or even enemies of the nation, 
who deny cooperation in his understanding. This is an extremely populist 
interpretation of the polity – on the one side an elite, alienated from the nation 
                                                 
1 In a speech held for diplomatic delegations in Budapest, 2010, in excuse when confronted 
with some disturbing utterances of him, Budapest, 2010  
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respectively from the people, occasionally even indicted as of high treason, 
while on the other side the people with its self-appointed representatives, on 
top with the “eternal prime minister of the nation”. (As Orbán was called since 
he lost election in 2002. “The homeland cannot be in opposition”, was his 
famous saying in those disheartening days.) This expresses a kind of Carl 
Schmittian world in which every issue, should it be cultural, religious, 
economic or social, can and should be transformed to politics if it is able to 
group people into friends and foes – a tactics Orbán used masterly as 
opposition leader in the last two legislative periods. This is one reason why 
every attempt to serious reform of the economic and social system failed in 
Hungary, with lasting detrimental consequences also for the present 
government. Also akin with Schmitt’s political philosophy is his obsession with 
state sovereignty, and his condemnation of the plural political forces that 
would tear apart the unitary state.  
From this vision emanates the political concept of the brand-new 
“system of national co-operation”. The basic political aims of the Orbán-
government were clearly expressed already in the first Declaration on National 
Co-operation that has been issued just after the electoral victory; it was a small 
leaflet that summarized the mission of the new power to change the Third 
Republic, which they found all too liberal, toward the “System of National Co-
operation.” The new government made it compulsory to hang it out on the 
walls of every public office and government and municipal institution. This 
partly programmatic, partly propagandistic text does not deserve any deeper 
analysis, as it only anticipates the following legislation process which 
concretized the original vision. 
The new government and its qualified parliamentary majority began 
its course indeed by a large-scale remodeling of the whole political system. It 
changed not only the personnel of many government offices, dissolved many 
existing institutions, but created brand new ones filling them exclusively with 
their own loyal party delegates. The changes affected even the composition of 
the government, which was reduced to only eight ministerial posts, all other 
ministries being reduced to mere state secretaries (a fact that caused some 
problems during the EU presidency of Hungary).  
One of the first legislations affected the media system of the country. 
The existing multi-party supervising bodies, elected by the former parliament 
have been dissolved and a whole range of new administrative bodies were set 
up to control not only the public media but to supervise the whole media 
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landscape in the country, including the National News Agency that got 
(unconstitutionally) anew under strict state control. All the new bodies have 
been filled with own political delegates, on the top with the leaders nominated 
for 9 years, i.e. well beyond one legislative period. Many other controlling 
instances have been reorganized only in order to bring them under control of 
the government. The Electoral Committee composed of multi-party 
delegations and experts, elected by the former parliament for 5 years, was the 
first to be dissolved, heading towards the municipal elections, and the new 
body has been filled with only ruling party delegates. The government curbed 
the role of the Constitutional Court in order not to endanger its financial 
policies (notably the nationalization of the private Pension Funds), but also as 
a kind of punishment because they throw back some other legislation they 
have found as unconstitutional. (The Court was also completed by five new 
members, among them ardent party politicians in order to ensure decisive 
majority in the judicial body.)  
The earlier system of tripartite interest mediation was dismissed and 
replaced by a new consultative body with arbitrarily invited partners. The 
Budgetary Council beside the President of the National Bank of Issue was 
dissolved, and the Monetary Council was completed with new members 
politically loyal to the government. The juridical system has also been changed, 
and all serving judges over 62 years age have been retired (formerly they could 
serve until the age of 70.) The public and higher education system also 
undergoes major changes, and not only because of financial reasons. The new 
law on public education foresees the takeover of the schools maintained earlier 
by the municipal government. In the higher education, the state reduced 
heavily the financed places especially in the social sciences, legal studies and 
humanities, and foresees a self-maintaining higher education system financed 
by the students with the parallel provision of a “student loan” system. A much 
debated new act on religious freedom determined that religious nominations 
have to apply for acknowledgment and that the legislative body has the right to 
decide which religious communities may count as churches and which not. The 
new spirit of the government course is, however, best expressed by the new 
constitution which was introduced without real consultation with political 
partners and without broad public discussion, which is rather curious when 
the common normative ground of the political community everybody should 




It is impossible to deal with all the new policies initiated by the 
government, also because I lack the necessary expertise to judge the content of 
all important policy innovations. (Among them the most debated new “un-
orthodox” economic policy of the government which brought about conflicts 
with the EU, the IMF and with the international financial or political ranking 
institutions.2  Therefore in the following I deal only with those issues which 
have a detrimental effect on pluralism. These are the same questions which 
elicited an infringement procedure initiated by the EU Commission, 
respectively a review by the Venice Commission for Democracy by Law and the 
Council of Europe. I concentrate on the Media Laws, on complains about 
violating the principles of checks and balances, on the new constitution called 
“Basic Law”, and the change of the electoral system.  
 
On the Media Laws 
 
The Hungarian Parliament adopted two Media Acts, one on the freedom 
of the press and the fundamental rules on media content, usually referred to as 
Media Constitution, and one on media services and on the mass media.  (Act 
CIV. of 9. November 2010, and  Act CLXXXV. of December 30. 2010), 
respectively. Together these are called simply “media laws” that elicited serious 
criticism not only from the opposition but from the press home and abroad, 
and from international organizations like the European Parliament and the 
European Commission, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media 
and the Commissioner for Human rights of the Council of Europe. The Acts 
changed the whole regulatory system of the print and electronic media and 
reshuffled the structure of the public media, uniting different providers and 
submitting them to central control and supervision both in regard of financing, 
personnel, content providing, and news production.  
Content requirements are included in the mentioned Media 
Constitution that lists vague categories like the obligation to deliver objective 
and balanced information, to respect human dignity and human rights (the 
latter was taken out in a later amendment), to protect the majority from 
minority offences as well as the reputation of the church. 
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All the new decision-making powers, property and income of the public 
service media services (including the State News Agency) have been 
aggregated in the Public Service Fund, which is overseen and managed by the 
President of the Authority. The public media is allowed to use only the news of 
the Hungarian News Agency. Experience showed that news often became 
manipulated, and public service media outlets are politically lopsided. 
The practice of appointment to the regulating bodies deserved also 
critical attention: all the existing bodies, composed by delegated members on a 
corporative basis and elected by the former parliament, have been dissolved 
and new bodies created with members delegated exclusively by the 
government party faction. The President of the new Media Authority, a close 
political ally of the prime minister, got appointed for nine years and may be re-
elected any number of times. She is also Head of the Media Council, whose 
members were nominated exclusively by the government. It is noticeable that 
she can even serve much longer, if the next parliament will not be able to 
choose another person with a two-third majority. 
In case of violation of the law the Authority may impose a fine of up to 
EUR 722,000 (HUF 200,000,000) for electronic media and up to EUR 
90,000 (HUF 25,000,000) for printed and online media. After repeated and 
severe violation of the law, it may also erase an audiovisual media service 
provider from the register. 
In order to verify the violations, the Authority may access any data, even 
secrets protected by law, may hear witnesses even about secrets they hold, and 
may use this information in any other procedure anytime later. The Media 
Commissioner has the same investigative rights, even in cases when no 
violation of the law is suspected, and report to the Authority. Investigative 
authority may oblige the journalist to reveal his or her sources, in the interest 
of “national security, public order, or the investigation or prevention of 
crimes”. If someone who gets involved in the procedure – even if loosely 
connected to the media outlet against whom the procedure started – shows a 
behaviour which may potentially hinder the process, he or she may be fined up 
to EUR 3,600 (HUF 1000,000), or, if it is an organisation, up to EUR 90,000 
(HUF 25,000,000). The Parliament commissioned the Media Authority also 
with certain legislative rights.  
Although governmental influence on public media is not unknown in 
some other European countries, in older democracies the political culture and 
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unquestioned the long established press freedom may inhibit gross power 
abuse which can turn the public against the ruling elite. In Hungary with its 
protracted “Kulturkampf” such self-restrain of manipulating the public media 
is not to be expected, especially in case of a two-third majority of the 
government in office. 
The above listed international organs stated that the new acts on media 
violate the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention 
on Transfrontier Television and recommendations of the Council of Europe 
regarding the freedom of expression. All critiques stated that the existence of a 
free, pluralistic media sector is a cornerstone of democracy. The regulatory 
system of media has to guarantee independence from political influence and 
control. Under the present overwhelming majority of the government in the 
parliament and the one-sided practice of appointment into the Media Council, 
the Board of Trustees of the Public Service Foundation, the Public Service 
Board cannot ensure political independence.  
In the meantime findings of surveys conducted by media sociologists 
attested indeed heavy bias especially in the practice of news coverage for the 
governing parties and a negligence of broadcasting alternative rival messages. 
But the public sector is not the only which is affected by the “chilling effect” of 
content control. Community media content providers are not less endangered 
if they do not pare. The most famous case is the quarrel around the Club 
Radio, a broadcasting station giving voice to opposition views. Despite two 
court decisions in favor of its continuation the Media Authority is unwilling to 
prolong its registration, consequently to renew its license for a next contract 
period, and its allowance is lengthened provisionally every two month, 
threatening by closure. Commercial linear radios and televisions are not less 
dependent on the Authority’s decisions for their registration and licenses.  
Due to these criticisms the media law has been since slightly modified 
by the government, e.g. certain content rules do not apply to the print media, 
but the infringement procedure and monitoring by the European Committee 
and the Council of Europe still goes on. A recent report3 admitted that some 
important changes came to effect due to amendments but expressed still some 
concerns about the guarantees of press freedom. Maintained is the criticism 
about the appointment practice and the constrained right to appeal against the 
                                                 
3
 ‘Commission Vice-president Kroes welcomes amendments to Hungarian Media Law’, 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/89>, 16 February 2011. 
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verdict of the media authorities in the courts, two issues in which the 
government is reluctant to yield the international pressure. 
The whole debate on the new media regulation is important from the 
point of ensuring the conditions of free and fair elections as a prerequisite for 
democracy. In this respect it is also worth noticing that the switch to digital 
broadcasting, the deadline of which was foreseen for 2012, has been postponed 
by the government until the end of 2014, i.e. after the time of the next election. 
This fact is important in the light that in many households, especially in the 
countryside, presently only the public radio and television and the two (rather 
apolitical) commercial television broadcast can be received. 
 
Constitutional engineering in second edition 
 
During the election campaign of the party Hungarian Civic Union-
Fidesz in 2010 there was no mention of any intention to change either of the 
political system or the existing constitution. Experts of course knew that the 
leaders of the conservative camp were sternly committed to give the nation a 
new constitution which expresses their lofty ideas and their concern to uphold 
the heritage of the great and glorious Hungarian past. This has been declared 
in the introduction to the new “Basic Law” under the title “National Creed”. 
This is not simply a usual preamble referring to human rights but it rather 
gives a short conservative narrative of the history of the Hungarian Nation. 
The text contains a reference to the unwritten historical constitution, whatever 
that be, to the role of Christianity in maintaining the Hungarian nation, and 
declares respect for the Holy Crown which would embody the continuity of 
Hungarian constitutional statehood and express the unity of the nation. 
Furthermore, the text holds that this continuity was broken from 1944 on and 
until 1990 Hungary was under occupation. This narrative had two aims: first 
to cancel the Nazi and Communist period from the historical continuity of the 
nation (including the short semi-democratic period 1945-1948), second to 
deprive the existing Constitution of any legitimacy because of its alleged 
Stalinist origin. The fundamental modifications by the Roundtable 
Negotiations of 1989 remain unmentioned. It would not make any sense to 
contest this interpretation because it is not a scientific, i.e. debatable issue, but 
an expression of political will, written large into the Basic Law of the country. 
The Preamble “expresses the will of the nation“, and the “citizens of Hungary 
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are ready to found the order of the country on the ground of national co-
operation.” 
As for the political system, some innovations were made, whereas 
the bulk of the text does not differ much from the previous constitution. The 
name of the country has been changed to Hungary, the word republic having 
been omitted. It is more important that many issues have been written into the 
“Basic Law”, which would not belong to it. The number of decisions requiring 
qualified majority, a major flaw of the former constitution, increased instead of 
being reduced. The Basic Law fixed e.g. the official currency in the 
constitution, which means that the introduction of the European currency – an 
obligation for all newly accepted member-states – will depend on a two-third 
majority in any next legislative period. Even the newly introduced  linear flat 
tax system of the government has been written into the Basic Law. As prime 
minister Orbán declared openly to the international press, he wants to bind 
the hands of any next government in the foreseeable future. Some new 
institutions that should contribute to a strong national identity through art 
and ideological commitment, such as the Hungarian Academy of Arts, serving 
as an alternative institution to the existing Széchenyi Academy of Arts, are 
written into the Basic Law.  
It is impossible to analyze the whole new constitution here, but it 
clearly serves two basic purposes of the present government: on the one hand, 
to anchor ideological commitments of the ruling party in the “Basic Law”, 
which is expressed in the preambulum as mentioned above, and on the other 
hand to ensure the protection of all its newly created institutions against 
intended changes by any next government. Instead of going into details, I 
summarize shortly some criticism of the report of the Venice Committee for 
Democracy by Law. This international body of constitutional judges found the 
whole procedure of preparing and accepting the Constitution unsatisfactory 
because of a lack of broad consultation and because hasty introduction with 
only the consent of the governing party faction. The procedure lacked 
transparency and ignored real dialogue with the opposition, and provided 
“insufficient opportunities for an adequate public debate, and a very tight time 
frame.” The Venice Commission has not missed to criticize also some 
important ideological thesis of the Basic Law. It objects even the broad concept 
of nation in the Creed: “Such a wide understanding of the Hungarian nation 
and of Hungary’s responsibilities may hamper interstate relations and create 
inter-ethnic tension.” The concept of the unitary Hungarian nation within and 
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beyond the border suggests an extraterritorial claim for legal competence, 
while the national minorities are not regarded as part of the nation, only that 
of the state. The report also objects some important issues in regard to the 
appointment practice of the government in relation to the Attorney in Chief, 
and the President of the National Juridical Office. It criticizes the curbing of 
the rights of Constitutional Court, and the dismissing of the Judges over  the 
age of 62 years. It criticizes the high number of “cardinal issues” that require 
two third majority in order to be altered.. In this respect also the new electoral 
law is of great interest (see below). Besides, it criticizes also the lack of 
mentioning international obligations, and some specific articles about the 
protection of fetal life, about the possibility of dissolving municipal self-
governments by the parliament etc.4  
The Hungarian constitution required some change indeed, if only 
because it declared itself in 1990 as provisional to be modified later. Since then 
there was only one occasion when it could have been changed, during the 
socialist-liberal coalition government which attained also two-thirds majorities 
in the 1994-1998 legislation period. The government then restrained from 
changing the constitution because they could not find consensus with the 
opposition. This time the Fidesz-government did not have such scruples; its 
parliamentary majority imposed the new constitution upon the minority, and 
also against the public mood. The prime minister told journalists that he 
cannot feel any respect toward the old constitution. It remains to be seen, 
under such circumstances how much respect the new constitution will elicit 
from the citizens of the country, not to speak of the opposition parties in the 
future. 
  
Changes in the Electoral System 
 
The Hungarian Parliament passed a new electoral law at the end of2011 
(Act CCIII. of 2011.), which modified the former electoral system, a mixture of 
proportional and majoritarian system, in many points. One major innovation 
is that the number of the deputies became severely reduced from 386 to almost 
a half, to 199 members. 106 mandates will come from single member 
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constituences, where a plural vote (relative majority) decides over the mandate 
as opposed  to the former system which required absolute majority. 93 
mandates will come from a national list of party candidates. There remained 
one electoral round, whereas formerly there have been two rounds, which 
provided a chance for parties to coalesce in the second round. For the coming 
elections this means that parties challenging the present ruling party coalition 
have to decide before the elections whether they run on a common list or not. 
Without an electoral alliance parties of opposition will be doomed to failure at 
the next election, a fact they slowly recognized since. A smaller parliament 
with an overwhelming majoritarian character reduces the chances of smaller 
parties to get into the parliament. While the former electoral system also 
favored the winner (in order to get stable majority for government formation), 
the new system exacerbates this by assigning the not used votes of the winner 
in the individual districts (i.e. the difference of votes between the winner and 
the second challenger) to the national party list and thereby helps the winner 
to an overwhelming majority of mandates, a rather unique solution for getting 
premium mandates for the winner. 
For national minorities in Hungary a special list of candidates can be set 
up. Voters opting for this, however, are not allowed to vote for the national 
party lists. More important is the newly introduced voting rights of members 
of ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries, who took on double 
citizenship. Slovakia ruled out this possibility by law for their citizens, but 
Romania allowed this because its interest of double citizenship for their 
Romanian brethrens living in Moldavia.  Although Hungarians living beyond 
the border who gained Hungarian citizenship can vote only for the party list, it 
stands open, how many people will want to take part in the Hungarian 
elections at all. In a survey conducted in March 2011 53% of ethnic Hungarians 
with double citizenship in Transylvania are opting for Fidesz.5 The political 
landscape may change, however, until the next elections. 
                                                 
5 This was one reason why Fidesz joined a referendum in 2005 for providing Hungarian 
citizenship for ethnic Hungarians living beyond the borders. But this was also the main reason 
why the socialist-liberal coalition did not support it. The referendum was unsuccessful, but 
allowed the oppositon to push liberals and socialists into the corner of being un-national 
forces. One of the first acts of the present government was to remedy this grievance by an act 
on providing double citizenship. 
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A next feature of the new electoral law is an outright gerrymandering of 
the electoral districts in favor of the governing coalition. It is a positive change 
that the numbers of individual districts have been reduced from 176 to 106, 
and by this they reflect a more proportional distribution of the voters. But in at 
least 25 cases the borderlines were changed to disrupt districts with usually 
strong socialist voting preferences. The new electoral law also reduced the 
number of the necessary supporting signatures that party candidates have to 
gather. But two further changes are problematic, both implying lower electoral 
participation. First, any participation threshold for a valid mandate was 
cancelled. Second, the government insisted on introducing a preliminary 
voter’s registration system. While this could be reasonably argued for in the 
case of voters living beyond the borders, it was unnecessary for domestic 
voters. Inspite of sharp protest of the whole opposition it was nevertheless 
pushed through the legislation and was elevated even into the transitional 
regulations of the Basic Law. The Constitutional Court, however, annihilated 
this part of the Act on Electoral Procedures with the argument that it curbs a 
basic right of citizens. 
Other regulations foresee the exclusion of double posts for being 
municipal mayor and parliamentarian at the same time. (In the present 
parliament quite a few mayors possess parliamentary mandates.) This seems 
to be a reasonable change when the number of members of parliament is cut in 
half. As for the supervision of the fairness of the election, however, the new 
Electoral Committee, consisting only of members delegated by the 
government, has also the right to decide over the scope of activities of the 
visiting foreign monitoring experts. 
As stated earlier, the next elections will be a critical test for the new 
order in proving its real democratic character. Free and fair elections are a 
basic precondition for democracy, and this elevates the importance of the new 
electoral system. This is the reason that international organizations find it 
necessary to monitor the whole legislation process in this respect. 
 
 




Pluralism is a much broader concept than being mere political. It is a 
multidimensional concept which includes religious, spiritual and cultural 
diversity, the right to follow different life-styles, represent social values, to 
protect social interests of groups and maintain cultural identities. Political 
pluralism is, nevertheless, much needed to safeguard all the other aspects of 
pluralism. Clinging on a unitary concept of national community, however, is 
not an ideal ground for maintaining plural commitments and to foster that 
“bicameral orientation to political life” (W. Connolly, p. 4.) which furthers 
tolerance (as the most important value of pluralism) and peaceful settlement 
of unavoidable social conflicts. A narrow concept of national sovereignty 
(especially if it has ethnocentric biases or as in the case of the radical right, 
even racial connotations) denies pluralism and does not fit to the needs of 
people in a modern, complex, globalizing world. The political nation needed to 
be conceived rather as a “majority assemblage” (W. Connolly, p. 9.) in which 
alternative visions for the common good are provided and stand for electoral 
choice. 
The German political scientist Wolfgang Merkel and his colleagues 
(Merkel et al., 2003, p. 68.) summarized some basic types of weaknesses of 
new and unconsolidated democratic systems in the critical notion of “defective 
democracies”. Two categories are of interest here if we ponder on the character 
of the present political changes in new democracies. The one is the type of 
“delegated democracy”, the other the “illiberal democracy”. In the former, the 
separation of powers comes short, and the control over the highest authorities 
is weak or missing. Presidential systems are prone to slip into this, recalling  
the concept of “plebiscitary leader-democracy” coined by Max Weber. The 
parliament has here a mere sham-existence, the judiciary stands under 
constant political pressure, and the leader leans on direct popular mandate. 
Today the term “Putinization” refers to such a development. Charles Gati cites 
the words of Vaclav Havel in this respect: “Everything seems to follow the rules 
of democracy. There are parliaments, there are elections, and there are 
political parties. But there are also highly worrisome and unnaturally close ties 
between elected officials, the judiciary, the police, and the secret services.”  
As for the other type, illiberal democracies appear in countries where 
traditions of “Rechtstaat” (rule of law) are week. Here the governments have 
been elected by majority votes, but there are no guarantees for the citizen’s 
equal rights and liberties. Independence of jurisdiction does not prevail; 
principles of rule of law are often violated. The realm of politics and 
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administration is often corrupt. A strong patronage and clientele system is in 
work, a “cleptocracy” finds its way into the state power, curbing also the 
development and functioning of the free market. A kind of partocracy is in the 
making, distorting political competition and constraining the emergence of 
new alternatives. The political culture shows strong populist characteristics, 
and political lethargy and exaltation alternate. (s. Bayer, 2010. 20.)  
Such complaints about possible defects we can find more or less realized 
in most young democracies. Some of these problems are inherited from an 
authoritarian past, including both the pre-war and the post-war period of our 
national history. But path-dependency is not the only reason for such 
authoritarian inclinations. Many new problems derive from the parallel 
introduction of capitalist market economy and political democracy and from 
their uneasy relation for the next future, under economic strains of crisis and 
deep-going social differentiation. In the 1990-ies the social and economic 
problems seemed to be transitional and there was hope that after going 
through the “valley of tears” (Dahrendorf) we shall arrive at safe harbors. But 
after 2000, despite the EU-accession in 2004, too many people lost hope that 
they can overcome their bad fate being losers of the system change. The social 
differentiation grew enormously in the last two decades, and impoverishment 
is growing. The rate of impoverishment according to the relative poverty rating 
(i.e. 60% of the mean income level) used by Eurostat seems not comparatively 
high (12 % of the whole population), but regarding the much lower general 
income level in Hungary the threshold of poverty is also lower. Using the 
minimum subsistence model based on a consumption basket necessary for 
livelihood, it is not surprising that almost 4 million people belong to the poor.6 
Bad unemployment statistics can be polished up only by government programs 
for miserably paid “public work” which should help about two hundred 
thousand people. The Hungarian economy suffers from a deep recession since 
2008 and now also from a kind of investment strike due to unorthodox 
economic policies of the government. Hungary is at present plagued by lasting 
economic stagnation. The social-psychological climate in the country reminds 
one to the situation described by Eric Fromm in his famous book “Escape from 
freedom (Fromm, 1994 (original edition 1941). Large parts of the population 
live in uncertainty and existential “Angst”, looking for a strong state and a 
helping hand of a strong leader, a fact that explains partly the landslide 
electoral victory of the present political rulers. In spite of the regrettable social 
                                                 
6
 KSH (2011): Magyarország, 2010, http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xforintp/idoszaki/mo/mo2010.pdf. The 
homepage of www.ksh.hu has also an English Publication Repertory. 
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situation, a remake of authoritarianism would not help overcoming social and 
economic problems, and cannot strengthen the nation as a community of 
solidarity (“Solidaritätsgemeinschaft”); just the opposite, it would seriously 
deteriorate its case. While “authoritarian temptations” might be strong in our 
country, its triumph would not provide any solution.  Pluralism remains 
therefore much needed for a cooperative mindset and for looking common 
solutions to our situation, and is by far not an outdated concept, neither in 
theory, nor in praxis. With the growing diversity and disparity of our world it 
becomes even more important. (Cf. Eisfeld, 2006, 2012, passim.) Which path 
the Hungarian democracy will go in the next future, remains to be seen.  
Lasting engagement for democratic pluralism remains at any rate of great 




Bayer, J. – Hardi, P.: Pluralizmus. Budapest, Kossuth Kiadó, 1985. 
Bayer, J. : The Trials of Democratic Consolidation in Hungary. In: Bayer, J. – 
Jensen, J. (Eds.): From Transition to Globalization. New Challenges for 
Politics, Media and Society. PTI, Budapest 2007. 9-22. 
Bozóki, A.: Politikai Pluralizmus Magyarországon. Századvég Kiadó, Budapest 
2003.  
Connolly, William: Pluralism. Duke UP, Durham and London, 2005. 
Dahl, R. A.: Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. New Haven, Yale UP, 1982. 
Dahl, R. A.: Polyarchy. New Haven and London, Yale UP 1971. 
Dahrendorf, Ralph: Eight Remarks to Populism. 19.08.2007, in: 
http://www.eurozin.com/comp/focalpoints/populism.html  
Ehrlich, Stanislaw – Wootton, Graham (Eds.): Three Faces of Pluralism: 
Political, Ethnic, Religious. Gower Publishing Company Ltd., 
Westmead, England, 1980.  
Eisfeld, Rainer: Pluralism. Developments in Theory and Practice of 
Democracy. IPSA World of Political Science Series 4. Ed. Barbara 
Budrich, Opladen/Farmington Hills, 2006. 
 23 
 
Eisfeld, Rainer: Radical Approaches to Political Science. Roads Less Travelled. 
Barbara Budrich Publishers, Opladen, Berlin, Toronto 2012.  
European Social Register 2010. Ed. by L. Füstös, L. Guba, Y. Szalma. Institute 
for Political Science, Institute for Sociology, HAS, Budapest.  
Fromm, Eric: Escape from Freedom. Henry Holt and Company, LLC. 1994. 
(Orig. 1941.) (Die Furcht vor der Freiheit. Deutscher Taschenbuch 
Verlag, 14. Auflage, C.H. Beck, Nördlingen, 2008. 
Gabriel A. Almond: A Discipline Divided. (Schools and Sects in Political 
Science). Newbury Park, London, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1998. 
pp. 173. 
Gati, Charles: Backsliding in Budapest. The American Interest, 
January/February issue 2012.  
Huntington, S.: The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Centrury. University of Oklahoma Press. 1993. p.  
Kotkin, Stephen: Uncivil Society. 1989 and the Imploolsion of the Communist 
Establishment. Random House, New York. 2009. (1st ed.), 2010. (2nd 
ed.) 
Merkel, Wolfgang et al.: Defekte Demokratie. Bd I. Theorie. Opladen, Leske + 
Budrich. 2003. 
Merkel, Wolfgang: Are Dictatorships returning? Contemporary Politics, Vol. 
16. No. 1. March 2010, 17-31. 
Przeworski, Adam et al.: Democracy and Development:  Political Institutions 
and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge Studies in the 
Theory of Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 1st publ. 2000, 
Digital (Kindle) edition 2005., loc. 265. 
Schmitt, Carl: Der Begriff des Politischen. Verlag Duncker and Humblot. 
Berlin, pp. 37-45. (Pluralismus als Theorie der Auflösung des Staates.) 
1963. 
Three Faces of Pluralism: Political, Ethnic, Religious. Ed. by Ehrlich, Stanislaw 
and Wootton, Graham. Gower Publishing Company, 1980.   
 
 24 
 
 
